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This publication is a product of the South Asia Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management Unit.  It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its 
research and make a contribution to development policy discussions in Pakistan and around 
the world. Policy Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The authors may be contacted at Jlopezcalix@worldbank.org. 
 
  
Abstract 
 
This paper explores stylized facts of Pakistan’s growth patterns. It identifies the short-lived 
predominant character of its increasingly scarce growth accelerations, the average volatility 
of the growth rate by international standards, the high but decreasing correlation between 
overall growth and agricultural growth, the long term decline of its growth (potential) rate to 
around 4.5 percent, well below the 6 percent rate of the 1960s or from the 7 percent rate 
required for absorbing the young labor force. It also explores the dramatically steady fall in 
productivity during the 2000s (measured by Total Factor Productivity) and, to a lesser 
extent, capital accumulation as main reasons of such decline. The paper analyzes the role 
factor accumulation plays in long-term labor reallocation across sectors, with industry 
stalling, agriculture still playing a major role that goes beyond its own contribution to GDP, 
and services playing an increasing role in creating employment, but on low productivity jobs. 
Growth acceleration is not assured and Pakistan will need to create more jobs moving from 
agriculture to industry and services in activities where productivity is higher, but to do this, 
curbing the factors that constraint growth—overall and sectoral—and Total Factor 
Productivity in particular will be essential.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to 
encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get 
the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers 
carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, 
interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. 
They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
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An Economy Prone to Booms and Busts  
 
1. Booms and busts are no news to Pakistan’s economy.  In the 1960s, 1980s and the 
period between 1999 and 2005, all booms occurred under military regimes—Ayub Khan, Zia 
ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf respectively. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per-capita growth 
reached averages above 4 percent a year (Figure 1). Not only political stability, but high levels 
of external aid and ability to push through reforms appear associated to growth spurts 
(World Bank 2010).1  
  
2. By contrast, stagnation and busts during the 1970s and the 1990s have kindled 
debates about the trade-off between growth and democracy. In the past, political instability 
was blamed because none of the democratic regimes (except the one under Zulfikar Bhutto 
in 1970s) lasted their full term. The 1990s were particularly worrisome as the alternation 
between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif took place every two years or so—precisely when 
growth performance was poorest. As democratic governments failed to deliver high growth 
(and related poverty reduction), increasing public apathy toward the electoral process 
unfolded. Voter turnout in Pakistan declined from 47 percent in 1977 to 31 percent in 1997. It 
is even more troubling that the trade-off has been internalized to the extent that growth 
expectations have become progressively less optimistic and compounded by concerns about 
the security situation in the country. 
 
3. Whereas empirical evidence strongly supports the view that military regimes have 
achieved higher rates of growth than democratic regimes for Pakistan, this conclusion 
deserves a few caveats.  Granted, between 1960-61 and 2008-09, Pakistan’s average rate of 
growth was 5.3 percent. Military regimes reached an average 6 percent rate of growth vis-à-
vis an average 4.3 percent for democratic regimes. However, Burki (2007a) points out that 
this performance gap is not due to the fact that military provided better economic leadership, 
but to political stability and policy continuity, which were supported by generous external aid 
(also benefitting military outlays). Hussain (2009) points out that these military regimes 
were also unsustainable, as the lack of political legitimacy finally undermined their 
durability. Khan (2007) compares the Musharraf regime (1999-2007) to the preceding 
democratic regimes (1988-99) and finds slightly better performance in terms of GDP growth, 
but worse in terms of social indicators, which could explain their limitations. Hussain (2009) 
also concludes that the narrowly based elite, advancing its private and parochial interests, is 
the true decision-maker; determining regime changes (and growth patterns) in Pakistan. 
 
Featuring Short-lived Growth Accelerations 
 
4. Pakistan’s high-growth episodes tend to be short-lived, although longer than low-
growth periods. Despite that, over the last fifty years the economy has grown on average by 
around 5.4 percent per year—its growth pattern is full of short cycles of rapid growth 
followed by stagnation. Indeed, the country has not been able to sustain high growth for 
more than only a few years. Haussmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2004) define growth 
accelerations as periods with an increase of GDP per-capita growth of 2 percentage points or 
more for at least 8 years.2 Accounting for population dynamics, such a figure would be 
                                                          
1 Simple correlation between aid/GDP and GDP growth is 34 percent, including remittance receipts it goes up to 
44 percent. 
2 Their filtering technique also requires a post-acceleration growth rate of at least 3.5 percent a year and post 
acceleration GDP to be above pre-acceleration levels. 
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roughly equivalent in Pakistan to an increase of at least 5 percent in GDP growth rates. 
Generally speaking, these growth accelerations tend to be correlated with increases in 
investment and trade, real exchange rate depreciations, and with political regime changes 
(Haussmann, Pritchett and Rodrik 2004). Furthermore, external shocks tend to produce 
growth accelerations that fizzle out; while economic reform remains a significant predictor of 
accelerations that are sustained.  
 
 
 
 
   Source: World Development Indicators and Polity IV project (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm);  
   Polity2 is an indicator of democracy with scores range from +10 (best) to worst(-10). 
 
 
5. Applying this axiom to Pakistan, rules out any episode of growth acceleration over the 
last fifty years. Since 1962, there have been only two periods where growth consistently 
remained above 5 percent per annum for more than 4 years. This is despite the fact that over 
the 50-year period, growth remained above 5 percent for 28 years (Table 1). Hence, episodes 
of robust growth are frequent, but not sustained. This is not the case in many comparable 
countries in the region such as India, China, Malaysia and South Korea, which have all 
managed to grow at relatively high rates for a considerable period of time. Therefore, 
Pakistan finds it difficult to achieve sustained periods of high growth as its growth 
performance remains uneven and features repeated turning points after a few years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pakistan GDP Growth under Military & Democratic Regimes 1969-2010 
Economic Growth 1961–2009 
Figure 1 
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High Growth > 5%  Low Growth < 5%  Total 
Periods 
Episodes of 
Growth 
(Consecutiv
e Years) 
Average 
Growth 
 Periods 
Episodes of 
Growth 
(Consecuti
ve Years) 
Average 
Growth 
 Years 
Average 
Growth 
FY78-FY83 6 6.9%  FY97-FY03 7 3.3%  50 5.4% 
FY62-FY66 5 7.3%  FY08-FY11 4 2.9%   
 
FY85-FY88 4 6.8%  FY75-FY77 3 3.3%    
FY04-FY07 4 7.3%  FY71-FY72 2 1.8%    
FY68-FY70 3 7.7%  FY89-FY90 2 4.6%    
FY73-FY74 2 7.1%  FY93-FY94 2 3.2%    
FY91-FY92 2 6.5%  FY67 1 3.1%    
FY95-FY96 2 5.8%  FY84 1 4.0%    
Total 28 7.0%  Total 22 3.3%    
 
 
6. Growth volatility has been wrongly associated with short-lived growth. Strictly 
speaking, volatility and uncertainty are not exactly synonymous as the former refers to the 
overall variation of one variable around some central trend, while the latter refers only to the 
unpredictable part of such variation. Contrary to common statements in the literature, 
Pakistan’s growth volatility is average when compared to worldwide levels. Over the last five 
decades, the volatility of its GDP growth, as measured by the standard deviation of the 
growth rate of real GDP, was 2.2 percent; near about the average in South East Asia, and 
second lowest worldwide after Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries—the least volatile region in the world (World Bank, 2000).  Our estimates, 
however, also point out to a steady increase in real GDP volatility in the last three decades, 
rising from 1.4 in the 1980s to 2.5 in the 2000s.     
 
Still Relying on Agricultural Sector and Prone to Natural Disasters 
 
7. Pakistan’s non-sustained growth performance is also due to its strong, albeit 
declining, reliance in the agricultural sector. Although agriculture has gradually halved its 
share of GDP from 42 percent in 1960 to 21 percent in 2009, Figure 2 shows the existence of 
a high correlation between real GDP and real agricultural GDP—even though such 
correlation weakens in the 2000s—as services sector has the largest share in the economy.3 
                                                          
3 It would be useful to provide employment by sector at the same time as discussing GDP contribution so (a) the 
industrial transition is clearly understood, (b) the different levels of worker productivity in the three sectors 
comes out, and (c) agricultural income as a critical support for domestic demand is implied. The last point will 
help understand how exactly agriculture correlates with overall GDP growth, as export agriculture is important 
but relatively small. 
Pakistan: Growth Accelerations Table 1 
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 Source: World Bank staff elaboration 
 
 
8. Political uncertainty and natural disasters have also contributed to growth reversions. 
Haussmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2004) mention that international experience suggests 
that growth spurts also coincide with regime changes. Looking closely at Pakistan’s economic 
history, above average growth rates in the 1960s and 1980s coincided with episodes of 
reform and economic and political stability along with high levels of external aid. In contrast, 
during the 1970s and 1990s, political upheaval, economic uncertainty and regional tensions 
were accompanied by few or incomplete reforms and, toward the end of the 1990s, 
macroeconomic instability and the resulting inability of policymakers to implement and 
sustain policies necessary for growth and poverty reduction (Figure 3). Thus, on empirical 
terms, political uncertainty—using external aid and/or workers’ remittances inflows as its 
proxy—also accounts for a significant explanation of growth dynamics. Over 5 decades, the 
simple correlation coefficient between the aid/GDP ratios and GDP growth rates is 0.34, and 
it reaches 0.44 percent when adding remittances receipts. In addition, natural disasters have 
made their toll in explaining a few episodes of growth reversion. This is certainly the case of 
the late 2000s—a period that witnessed 4 natural disasters in 5 years, and more recently 
2010-11 with the floods.         
 
With Growth Potential on a Declining Trend 
 
10. Pakistan’s economy is on a declining long run trend both in potential and actual 
growth. Perhaps more disturbing than the inability to sustain growth spurts over long 
periods of time, is the steady fall in the economy’s potential, which would suggest the 
country has gradually eroded its strengths over time. To estimate potential growth we use a 
simple linear trend (LT) and a more refined Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtering technique. Our 
findings suggest that (a) potential growth (LT and HP trends) has been falling over the past 
Correlation between Agricultural & Real GDP Growth Rates (%) Figure 2 
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50 years and (b) actual growth is below trend, i.e. the economy is underperforming (Figures 
3 and 4).   
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank staff elaboration 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank staff elaboration 
 
11. The graph allows distinguishing the period before and after 2007. The former 
features a demand-driven boom, led by credit expansion: between 2003 and 2006 private 
credit grew at annual rates above 20 percent (and 33 percent in 2004-05). As a result, 
economic growth rose to 7.5 percent in 2004 and overheated at 9.0 percent in the following 
year, but reversed afterward. In 2008, the global crisis put an end to this cycle and Pakistan 
fell into stagflation, i.e. low growth and double-digit inflation rates. Since then, Pakistan’s 
economy has been struggling for a mild recovery, but the 2010 floods, erratic macro-policies 
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and adverse oil and food international prices have contributed to a returning stagflation—
this time an under-heating economy.   
    
12. Pakistan growth potential is eroding. Figures 3 and 4 also show that in the last fifty 
years Pakistan’s steady annual GDP growth rate has fallen from 6 per cent to about 4.5 
percent.  This rate is much lower than the 7 percent the Government estimates is needed to 
absorb youth employment (Planning Commission 2011).  Therefore, unless the Government 
adopts a new growth strategy and implement it successfully, the country will continue 
depreciating its assets and constraining its productive capacity. What is wrong with 
Pakistan’s economic growth? The findings of a growth accounting model often provide useful 
insights about the reasons underlying such decline.     
 
Long Term Declining Growth Can Be Associated to Falling Productivity  
 
13. Growth accounting models are perhaps the most popular ones in the academic 
literature of Pakistan.4 In general, they are well known both by their methodology of 
estimation as well as by their application to 2-factors of production—capital and labor inputs 
(Annex 1). In this section, we apply the growth accounting framework to 4 factors of 
production: capital, labor, human capital (measured by years of schooling) and land 
(measured by arable land). We proceed stepwise: first, we separate the individual 
contributions of labor productivity (output per worker) and labor accumulation 
(employment) to real output growth; and second, we estimate the contribution of capital, 
human capital, land and TFP to labor productivity. Being the residual term, TFP measures 
the particular combination of changes in technology and changes in efficiency with which 
inputs are used. 
 
14. Our overall empirical findings replicate (and expand) some of the conclusions found 
in previous growth accounting models over the past thirty years. These are:  
a. growth in Pakistan has been mainly driven by labor and capital accumulation 
rather than productivity growth, as measured by TFP;  
b. whereas labor accumulation has been on the rise, labor productivity—measured 
by output per worker—has been steadily declining. As among its regional 
competitors, Pakistani labor is also the least productive and the gap has increased 
in the last two decades (Planning Commission, 2011);  
c. the contribution of capital to labor productivity growth has become decreasingly 
important—almost nil in the 2000s—thus making capital accumulation an 
important driver behind growth in the eighties. However, its weight has 
significantly decreased in the 2000s5 as a consequence of diminished public 
investment—which halved from 10 percent of GDP in the early 1980s to 5 percent 
of GDP in the mid-2000s—and private investment improving only from 8 percent 
of GDP to 10 percent of GDP over the same period; only to see a recent revival 
since 2005 led by the private telecommunication sector and general government 
investment;  
d. TFP contribution has also been relevant, but dramatically declining to about one 
fourth of its 1980s level in the 2000s, reaching an average value of 1.4 for the 
                                                          
4 For most recent work, see World Bank (2006), Favaro and Koehler-Geib (2010) and Planning Commission 
(2011). 
5 This decrease also corresponds to the significant fall in the investment-to-GDP ratio from a peak 31.3 percent of 
GDP in the sixties to a bottom 18.4 percent of GDP in the 2000s (Table 2).   
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whole period, i.e. a contribution of about one-third of GDP growth, still below 
medium-term average of 2.0 in East Asia (World Bank 2006, 2010; IMF 2004); 
e. the contribution of human capital (using schooling as a proxy) was significant in 
the 80s, almost nil in the 90s, but rose again in the 2000s.6 Hausmann (2009) 
indicates that as labor supply is fast growing and the country still has a very low 
enrollment in primary education rate, it appears to evolve toward an economy 
intensive in unskilled labor, which obviously limits its potential for raising its 
labor productivity;  
f. land contribution to labor productivity has been persistently negative—and close 
to nil.  
 
15. What makes TFP productivity slow down? Multiple responses have been advanced. 
Khan (2006) finds that TFP growth in Pakistan is associated with macroeconomic stability, 
foreign direct investment and the financial sector. World Bank (2006) indicates that TFP 
growth was particularly strong in periods where the macroeconomic environment improved 
and political stability ensued. Mahmood and Siddiqui (2000) point to TFP growth’s close 
correlation with low levels of science and technology. All in all, and not surprisingly, the 
Framework for Economic Growth concludes that the most crucial problem for Pakistan’s 
growth challenge is its abysmally low productivity (Planning Commission 2011).  
 
 
Source: World Bank staff 
 
                                                          
6
 Human capital in Pakistan has always been low. Educational enrollment at all levels is below its regional peers 
(21%, 14 % and 6% in primary, secondary and tertiary respectively), and the country invests 42 percent lower in 
health spending per capita. Two political economy reasons behind low human capital in Pakistan are elite 
domination and ethnic factionalism. Landed aristocracy does not see the merits of taxing itself to pay for mass 
education. High ethnic factionalism is found to be associated with poor institutions, bloated bureaucracy and 
under-provision of public goods (Easterly 2003). 
Average Annual Percentage Rate of Change 
 
 
 
Period 
Real 
Output 
Growth 
Investment 
as % of 
GDP 
(constant 
prices 
2000) 
Employment 
Growth 
Output 
Per 
Worker 
Growth 
Output per worker: 
% Contribution of 
Physical 
Capital 
Human 
Capital 
Arable 
Land 
TFP 
Total 
Economy 
FY81-FY90 6.1 18.18 1.8 4.3 1.2 0.9 -0.2 2.4 
FY91-FY00 4.4 18.79 2.4 1.9 0.8 -0.2 -0.3 1.5 
FY01-FY10 4.8 16.56 3.8 0.9 0.1 0.6 -0.4 0.6 
FY81-FY11 5.0 17.69 2.7 2.2 0.7 0.4 -0.3 1.4 
Agriculture 
FY81-FY90 4.0 1.95 1.8 2.2 1.4 0.4 -0.7 1.2 
FY91-FY00 4.4 2.11 1.6 2.8 1.0 -0.1 -0.6 2.4 
FY01-FY10 2.7 1.64 3.2 -0.5 0.0 0.1 -1.8 1.2 
FY81-FY11 3.6 1.88 2.3 1.3 0.8 0.1 -1.1 1.5 
Industry 
FY81-FY90 7.7 5.77 2.0 5.6 1.7 0.7 0.0 3.1 
FY91-FY00 4.2 6.87 1.0 3.2 2.7 -0.1 0.0 0.6 
FY01-FY10 6.1 5.26 5.0 1.0 -0.9 0.5 0.0 1.5 
FY81-FY11 5.8 5.87 2.7 3.0 1.0 0.3 0.0 1.6 
Services 
FY81-FY90 6.6 10.47 2.8 3.7 0.6 1.2 0.0 1.8 
FY91-FY00 4.5 9.81 3.7 0.8 0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.8 
FY01-FY10 5.1 9.66 4.1 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.1 
FY81-FY11 5.4 9.94 3.5 1.8 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.9 
Pakistan Sources of Annual Growth in Labor Productivity, FY81-FY11 Table 2 
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Sectoral Results 
 
16. An analysis of inter- and intra-sectoral results show that GDP growth in Pakistan 
decelerated from 6.1 percent in 1980s to 4.4 percent in the 1990s, before mildly recovering to 
4.8 percent in the 2000s.  This was partly due to a sharp decline in labor productivity from 
4.3 percent in 1980s to 1.9 percent in 1990s and to an anemic 0.9 percent in the 2000s. In 
addition, this deceleration was accompanied by steady decline in investment (as a ratio to 
GDP) and rates of all factors accumulation across the board. Decline in average TFP was 
dramatic, falling to about a quarter of its value of 2.4 percent in 1980s, even though TFP 
rates show some recovery at the end of the decade (Figure 5).  
  
 
 
     
17. In the 1980s, the economy enjoyed healthy performance, primarily due to physical 
capital accumulation and TFP contribution. The industry and services sectors were more 
dynamic with strong growth rates of 7.7 percent and 6.6 percent respectively (5.6 and 3.7 
percent in output per worker respectively), while agriculture achieved a respectable 4 percent 
growth. Contribution of physical capital-to-output per worker was particularly substantial in 
the industry and agriculture sectors. The latter sector still enjoyed the benefits of the green 
revolution technology of improved seeds, irrigation and increased fertilizer use that spurred 
rapid growth initially in crop agriculture (especially wheat and rice), and later in the rapid 
Growth in TFP in Output per Worker Figure 5 
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development of livestock production in the late 1970s (Dorosh, Niazi and Nazli 2003). The 
contribution of human capital was significant in the services sector (1.2 percent). Similarly, 
contribution of TFP was strong in industry (3.1 percent) and services (1.8 percent). It is 
worth noticing that the investment-to-GDP ratio in services averaged double digits at 10.5 
percent in this decade.    
 
18. All sectors also benefited from several positive macro factors. The lost growth 
momentum of the 1970s7 was partly recovered in the 1980s8 by a shift from both the policies 
of state ownership and control, the benefits of large investments made by the public sector in 
the 1970s, and a general environment of price stability and external inflows. Among large 
public investment projects, the most significant ones were the Tarbela Dam that 
considerably increased irrigation water availability, the hydel power project, and others in 
the fertilizer and cement sectors. Overall, an investment-to-GDP ratio averaging 18 percent 
and inflation rates averaging 7 percent were critical in stimulating growth and employment, 
which averaged 6 percent and 1.8 percent respectively. External inflows, such as workers’ 
remittances and increased foreign assistance due to Pakistan’s role in Afghan war, were also 
critical catalysts. TFP growth was strong in all three sectors—with a high 3.1 percent for 
industry—which is consistent with literature, showing that high TFP growth is normally 
associated with high investment and low inflation. The contribution of education was also 
significant—especially in services—due to the sharp rise in educational attainment and 
completion of secondary education. Between 1985 and 1990, the percentage of people above 
15 years who had completed secondary education quadrupled from 3.9 percent to 16.5 
percent. The contribution of land was negative (as it was in all three decades), as there was 
hardly any growth in availability of arable land. Though arable area remained stagnant, the 
number of workers per unit of land increased substantially over the period—in part also due 
to inheritance over generations—which would also lead to declining productivity in the 
1990s.  
 
19. In the 1990s, most factors that had contributed to positive growth in the previous 
decade reversed, while structural gaps inherited also affected macroeconomic performance. 
Declining quality of services and education, underperforming and loss making nationalized 
industries, power shortages, and macroeconomic imbalances—large fiscal deficits and a 
rapid buildup of public debt—plagued the economy and left unresolved issues for economic 
management. Interestingly enough, the decline in TFP is puzzling as it coincides with the 
liberalization of the economy. By mid to late 1990s, the Government undertook a large 
privatization program and major investments were undertaken in telecom, roads and power 
infrastructure. In other countries such as India, such types of liberalization had resulted in 
substantial growth in TFP (Bosworth, Collins and Virmani 2007), but this was not the case of 
Pakistan. Why? One reason could be that these reforms were fragmented, badly sequenced 
or truncated in the late 2000s. Another possible explanation is by McMillan and Rodrik 
(2011), who assert that the difference between Asia’s recent growth, on the one hand, and 
Latin America’s and Africa’s, on the other, can be explained by the variation in the 
contribution of structural change to overall labor productivity. Hence, one of the most 
                                                          
7 The decade of the 1970s featured several shocks; East Pakistan became Bangladesh in 1971 after a civil war. 
There were severe floods and political unrest. There was a paradigm shift in country’s economic model. Pakistan 
People Party nationalized all the major manufacturing industries, banking, insurance, education etc. which 
resulted in major disruption and loss of investor confidence. This experiment had negative impact on private 
sector growth, manufacturing and quality of education.  
8 The political regime of the 1980s abandoned further nationalization as state policy. However, it did not reverse 
the prior nationalizations.  
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striking findings is that in many Latin American and Sub-Saharan African countries, broad 
patterns of structural change served to reduce rather than increase economic growth since 
1990. And this was so because macroeconomics sustainability remained a serious concern 
throughout the decade, and political uncertainty9 contributed significantly to the fluctuations 
in economic growth. There was also a question of sequencing of reforms. For instance, 
financial sector reforms in 1990s were implemented before substantial reforms on the fiscal 
side. As a result, during the 1990s government finances were under stress due to higher 
borrowing cost emanating from financial liberalization. This was compounded by 
macroeconomic instability toward the end of the 1990s due to international sanctions 
imposed on Pakistan after a nuclear detonation. Overall, lower growth in the 1990s, rather 
than reflecting trade liberalization, indicates the changing nature of domestic politics; the 
vagaries of external assistance and the inability of policymakers to implement and, 
especially, sustain reforms. To compound matters, foreign inflows which remained a 
substantial source of financing during 1980s, dried up in the 1990s due to the loss of interest 
of donors in the region, as the Afghan war ended with the USSR pulling out.   
 
20. Where the contribution of physical capital continued to benefit the industry sector, all 
sectors, except agriculture, showed a marked decline in the contribution of TFP to labor 
productivity. Despite large investments, the industrial activity grew moderately as there was 
considerable inherited unutilized capacity available in the industry—especially in later half of 
1990s. For its part, the agriculture sector grew on average at 4.4 percent during the decade. 
Rather than as a result of substantial growth of 1.6 percent in employment, it was the 
outcome of rising labor productivity at 2.8 percent, with a major contribution from TFP.  For 
its part, the services sector continued to experience strong employment growth of 3.7 
percent, but its output per worker and TFP grew by only 0.8 percent. Contribution of human 
capital was negative across all sectors which is difficult to interpret. One reason might be that 
education attainment achieved in the second half of 1980s was not maintained in 1990s. 
 
21. In the 2000s, although economy grew on average by about 4.8 percent during 2000s, 
TFP contribution significantly declined across all sectors.10 Pakistan went through a 
stabilization program in early part of 2000s to attain macroeconomic stability and inflation 
was brought down to around 3 percent by mid-2000s. Post September 11, 2001, the 
economic sanction imposed after nuclear detonation was eased, which allowed significant 
foreign inflows and external debt rescheduling, thus creating a sense of stability on the 
external front. On the domestic front, substantial excess capacity available in industrial and 
power sector propelled growth acceleration in the mid 2000s, with a peak 8.9 percent rate in 
2004-05.  Muslehuddin (2007) compares the two periods of growth acceleration (1983-84 to 
1987-88 and 2002-03 to 2005-06) and finds that these were driven by an improved policy 
stance and a favorable external environment. But the latest spurt took place under healthier 
macroeconomic fundamentals, structural reforms, institutions, governance and private 
sector dynamism. Ensuing growth in employment during 2000s happened across all three 
sectors. However, sector disaggregation of employment finds that growth in Pakistan was not 
accompanied by the type of structural transformation which transfers labor from low 
productive sectors to high productivity sectors. In Pakistan, although employment in 
Agriculture grew by strong 3.2 percent labor productivity contracted by 0.5 percent. In 
                                                          
9 There were four elections, two caretaker governments and a military coup in 1999.  
10 However, the outcome is not as bad if we confine our analysis to the period before the political and balance of 
payment crisis (2002-03 to 2007-08). During this period, contribution of TFP growth in output per worker was 
substantial at 1.3 percent. 
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contrast, for China, during the period 1993-2004, agriculture sector employment declined by 
0.6 percent while productivity per worker grew strongly by 4.3 percent (Bosworth and 
Collins 2007).   
 
22. The sectoral break up also shows a mixed performance in 2000s.  The investments 
made in the 1990s in the infrastructure sector achieved full capacity in the 2000s, which 
allowed industry to achieve 6.1 percent growth in the sector. However, the average 
investment-to-GDP ratio of 17 percent in economy (and barely 5 percent in industry) was 
lowest in three decades. Therefore, the contribution of capital-to-output per worker was 
particularly negative at 0.9 percent in industry during the 2000s, especially in the power 
sectors. The services sector also grew strongly at 5.1 percent during the decade, but despite a 
4.1 percent growth in sectoral employment, growth in both labor productivity and TFP were 
anemic at 1.0 percent and 0.1 percent respectively.11 This shows again that services sector 
growth was mainly the result of labor accumulation. Again, this is in contrast to India and 
China, where during 1993-2004, employment growth in services was accompanied by strong 
growth in output per worker from preceding periods (Bosworth and Collins 2007).  
Contribution of human capital was positive across all sectors. Services sector which is labor 
and skill intensive was its largest beneficiary with a contribution of 0.7 percent from human 
capital to output per worker. 
 
Conclusions 
 
22. Pakistan growth spurts have become scarce and growth patterns exhibit a decreasing 
trend. As the economy has a very low domestic saving rate (as percentage to GDP), Pakistan 
has remained dependent on foreign saving inflows to sustain its investments. Periods of 
positive growth performance have been better because foreign inflows were accessible and 
macroeconomic and political stability sustained policy regimes.   
 
23. Compared to East Asian countries, Pakistan lags in all factors of accumulation. Not 
only investment rates are low and decreasing, but Pakistan falls behind in human capital 
formation and TFP growth. Low investment rates are compounded by neglected human 
capital. Contemporary growth theory also stresses the importance of human capital and 
quality of policies implemented by governments. According to UNESCO estimates, 30 
percent of Pakistanis live in extreme educational poverty—having received less than two 
years of education. And as mentioned in the Framework for Economic Growth (Planning 
Commission 2011) “One in ten of the world’s primary-age children who are out of school live 
in Pakistan. This makes the country second in the global ranking of out-of-school children.  
This richest 20 per cent of Pakistanis receive almost 7 years of more education than the 
poorest. Less than half of women have ever attended school.”  
 
24. TFP growth can barely improve unless Pakistan’s record of structural reform 
improves.  Reform is fragmented and littered with a myriad of policy reversals. This perhaps 
is the reason that in Pakistan’s case, structural reform has not yielded results when 
compared to other countries. In other countries such as India, liberalization had resulted in 
substantial growth in TFP (Bosworth, Collins and Virmani 2007).  Economic policies should 
aim to harness private sector growth through level playing field, creating institution, 
incentives, markets to support innovation and better use of available resources.  
                                                          
11 For truncated period (2000-01 to 2007-08), contribution of TFP in output per worker was about 0.5 percent. 
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Annex 1.  Measuring Growth in Total Factor Productivity 
 
The output of an economy is a function of its endowments (labor, physical capital, human 
capital, land) and the productivity with which these endowments are used to produce a flow 
of goods and services (GDP). In our framework, the growth of per-capita output can, in turn, 
be expressed in terms of four determinants (a) physical capital deepening (b) human capital 
accumulation and (c) contribution of arable land and (d) TFP growth. Gains in TFP, 
reflecting more efficient use of inputs, have long been recognized as an important source of 
improvements in income and welfare. Cross-country differences in income levels and growth 
rates are mostly due to differences in productivity (Easterly and Levine, 2001). Measuring 
TFP is therefore important in assessing a country’s past and potential economic 
performance.  
 
We assume constant returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function to analyze the 
factor contribution and TFP in per worker output growth: 
 
                   ……………………… (1) 
 
Where Q, A, K, and Z are real GDP, TFP, physical capital stock and arable land area 
respectively.  The production function also depends on human-capital-adjusted labor input 
(LH) where L is labor force and H is human capital. One way to measure human capital is to 
adjust the number of workers for their average years of schooling (S) by assuming that each 
additional year raises workers’ productivity by a given percentage. Various estimates suggest 
that, defined in this way, the returns to education are between 5 to 10 percent. Following 
Bosworth and Collins (2007), we assume that every additional year of schooling raises the 
labor productivity by 7 percent.   
 
        
 
        in (1) are factor shares and measures of importance of physical capital and arable 
land in output. The factor shares are assumed in following table as they are not directly 
observable.  
 
Factor shares in   Agriculture Industry Services 
Capital α 0.25 0.55 0.20 
Arable 
Land β 0.50 0.00 0.00 
Labor 1-α-β 0.25 0.60 0.80 
 
We divide all variables in (1) by Labor (L) and take a log. Resulting growth in real GDP per 
worker    ⁄    is decomposed in any sector as the sum of contributions of growth in capital 
per worker    ⁄  , growth in land per worker    ⁄  , increases in education per worker     and 
the contribution of improvements in TFP    : 
 
 
 
   (
 
 
)   (
 
 
)             ……………………… (2) 
 
With the model parameters unchanged over the entire period by assumption, difference in 
aggregate growth between the periods is driven by underlying differences in factor 
accumulations and sectoral shifts. Srinivasan (2005) points out that all TFP growth 
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estimates without exception are highly sensitive to the data used, parameter assumption, and 
above all to the methodology of estimation. For example, different authors use different real 
GDP growth data—some using constant domestic price-based values and others who use 
purchasing power parity-based data. Also strong maintained assumptions are made in the 
empirical analysis about production functions and the statistical properties of the 
disturbance terms that are essential components of the model used for estimation. Errors of 
measurement can also lead to substantial errors in the estimated residual. The informal 
sector economic activity that is quite significant has not been fully accounted for and can 
cause measurement error. As discussed in World Bank (2000), the interpretation of 
measured TFP growth can also be problematic when growth reflects factors other than 
purely technical change—such as increasing returns to scale, markups due to imperfect 
competition or gains from sectoral reallocations. In one sense, due to these unknown factors, 
TFP is some time called “the measure of our ignorance” (Hausmann, Klinger and Wagner 
2008). 
   
Data are taken from number of sources for the period of 1980-81 to 2010-11. All data are 
constructed in per worker terms. For Real GDP data and sectoral shares we have used 
various issues of Economic Surveys. Data on arable land area over time is taken from FAO 
statistis.  Total and sectoral employment data is collected from ILO database. In the 
database, educational attainment before 2001 is gathered from surveys conducted every five 
years and the intermediate years are interpolated. Sector-wise educational attainment is 
available only from 2003 onwards and for the preceding years the trend in aggregate years of 
schooling is applied to the 2003 estimates. Upon closer scrutiny, the sharp rise in 
educational attainment and completion is concentrated at the secondary stage between 1985 
and 1990. The percentage of people above 15 years who have completed secondary level 
education quadrupled from 3.9 percent in 1985 to 16.5 percent in 1990. Though there may be 
data quality issues, indirect evidence from the censuses of 1981 and 1988 showed a surge in 
overall literacy from 26.2 to 43.9 percent. A ten-fold increase in number of private schools 
even in rural areas between 1983 and 2000 was a significant factor though the expansion 
seems to be concentrated in primary and middle school levels (Andrabi, Das and Khwaja 
2002). 
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